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INTENSIFYING TO CEASE:  UNPACKING THE PROCESS
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Legacy information systems consume a large portion of information technology budgets and often impose
serious limitations on organizations’ flexibility and innovation.  Despite the extensive literature on how organi-
zations adopt and use new IS, we know little about how organizations discontinue their legacy IS.  Current
studies suggest some actions and events to cease mechanisms such as legitimization, learning, and routinization
that give continuity to the systems.  However, we do not know when these actions emerge in the discontinuance
process to gradually reduce the organizational commitments to legacy IS, nor do we know how ceasing one
mechanism can facilitate or, conversely, hamper ceasing other mechanisms, especially when these systems
involve interdependences between various components.  Based on a process analysis of four software com-
panies, we show that, contrary to the current literature, IS discontinuance is not a matter of merely ceasing
each and every mechanism of an established IS; rather, it often requires that some mechanisms be temporarily
intensified to prevent premature discontinuance and enable subsequent cessation of other mechanisms. 
Through cross-case analysis, we articulate a set of causal mechanisms that expands our understanding of how
the discontinuance process can be differently shaped by organizational commitments and interdependences
involved in legacy IS.
Keywords:  Information systems discontinuance, self-reinforcing mechanisms, organizational path, obsoles-
cence, process model
Introduction 1
I wish we could start from zero.  Our emergent com-
petitors don’t have such a huge dependency as we
have.  They just start by choosing the right tech-
nology, but we have to also fight with the monster
we have created over the years.
This statement by the CEO of a software company inspired us
to ask:  How do organizations discontinue their legacy IS?  IS
discontinuance refers to “the cessation of the use of an organi-
zational information system” (Furneaux and Wade 2011, p.
574) that no longer contributes to organizational aims. 
1Youngjin Yoo was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  Chee-Wee Tan
served as the associate editor. 
The appendices for this paper are located in the “Online Supplements”
section of MIS Quarterly’s website (https://misq.org).
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IS discontinuance is vital when legacy systems “constrain
rather than support the ability of the organization to respond
to changing environmental conditions” (Alderson and Shah
1999, p. 115) and consume a major part of IT budgets (Slee
and Slovin 1997).  For instance, a survey of U.S. federal
agencies shows that 70% of the $62 billion annual IT budget
is devoted to maintaining legacy systems (MeriTalk 2013);
yet, about 75% of this cost does not provide any competitive
value for organizations (Hainaut et al. 2008). IS discon-
tinuance is particularly challenging in established industries
such as financial services where legacy IS comprises multiple
interdependent technological objects, organizational routines,
and actors to which organizations have developed historical
commitments (Polites and Karahanna 2012).
While the adoption and use of new systems have been at the
heart of IS literature, IS discontinuance has remained under-
researched (Furneaux and Wade 2011)2.  Research on IS dis-
continuance focuses on factors, such as dissatisfaction with
the legacy IS, that motivate users (Parthasarathy and Bhat-
tacherjee 1998) and managers (Furneaux and Wade 2011) to
stop using it.  Other studies suggest that to discontinue a sys-
tem, organizations need to cease the mechanisms that give
continuity to it (e.g., via disrupting legacy IS routines)
(Polites and Karahanna 2013) and delegitimizing current IS
choices (Sahay et al. 2010).
These views provide only a limited explanation of how organ-
izations discontinue their legacy systems.  First, prior studies
do not examine the process through which organizations
discontinue their systems.  Our position is that we should not
see IS discontinuance as an event, but as an iterative, emer-
gent process that consists of multiple phases and interactions.
Moreover, it is also important to examine the temporality of
actions that gradually reduce organizations’ commitments to
legacy IS.  Sometimes ceasing a mechanism too early can
harm the entire IS discontinuance if organizations fail to
mindfully manage their legacy commitments.
Second, prior studies examine discontinuance at the level of
individuals’ intentions but not as an organizational phenom-
enon.  In particular, prior studies do not examine how actions
taken by various organizational actors interact over time and
gradually cease the use of a system.  We consider discontin-
uance as a complex process that involves multiple interdepen-
dences across the legacy technological elements, organiza-
tional routines, heterogeneous actors, and various products
and services.  We argue that we must consider the mech-
anisms that give continuity to existing IS not as isolated from
one another, but rather as interdependent.  Therefore, we need
to understand how the discontinuance of one aspect of a
legacy IS (e.g., disrupting a specific IS routine) may facilitate
or hamper the discontinuance of other aspects.
Drawing upon organizational path literature (Sydow et al.
2009; Vergne and Durand 2011), we frame IS discontinuance
as a process that involves ceasing a set of interdependent self-
reinforcing mechanisms (SRMs).  A SRM refers to a mech-
anism such as legitimization, learning, and routinization, by
which each subsequent turn intensifies the previous turn
(Schreyögg and Sydow 2011).  Accordingly, we seek to
answer the question:  How do the actions and events that
cease the self-reinforcing mechanisms of a legacy IS interact
over time, leading to its discontinuance? 
We study the discontinuance of established systems that
underlie the products and services of four software com-
panies.  In so doing, we make three contributions.  First, we
show that IS discontinuance is not a set of independent
attempts to cease the various SRMs, but rather an iterative
process through which these attempts interact in a temporally
complex way.  In particular, we articulate and theorize four
phases, which constitute the discontinuance process: 
(1) realization, (2) reversion, (3) handover, and (4) marginali-
zation.
Second, the phases help us show that the IS discontinuance
process does not merely require ceasing underlying SRMs,
which is often proposed by the current theories (Stache and
Sydow 2014; Sydow et al. 2009).  Rather, paradoxically, it
also involves phases through which some SRMs are tem-
porarily intensified to enable the subsequent cessation of
other SRMs.
Third, through cross-case insights, we show the process is
contingent on the historical commitments and the interdepen-
dences between the various components of the legacy
systems.  We propose theoretical explanations that extend
current literature, especially when legacy IS involves exten-
sive commitments and/or interdependences.
In the next section, we conceptualize the IS discontinuance
process through organizational path theory.  We then report
our empirical inquiry of how IS discontinuance unfolded
differently in the four cases.  Finally, we discuss the theore-
tical and practical implications of our study.
2Technological discontinuance and related concepts, such as decommis-
sioning, sun-setting, retirement, and phasing-out, have been widely addressed
in the engineering field (Bartels et al. 2012). These studies usually propose
prescriptive models or depict best practices to guide practitioners in discon-
tinuing technological products. This literature usually treats discontinuance
as part of the process of managing technological product obsolescence.
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Theorizing IS Discontinuance
as a  Path-Breaking Process
We frame a legacy IS as a set of interdependent technologies,
actors, and routines that are developed and aligned through
historical decisions and actions (Lyytinen and Newman
2008).  Therefore, we need a theoretical perspective that
allows us to put at the forefront of our analysis the commit-
ments and interdependences that characterize the legacy IS.
We theorize the discontinuance process by drawing upon
organizational path literature (Garud et al. 2010; Singh et al.
2015; Sydow et al. 2009; Sydow et al. 2012), which explains
how a certain pattern of organizational choices and actions
(that constitutes a path) emerges, sustains, and is broken.  To
explain the emergence and dominance of a path, the theory
offers the concept of self-reinforcing mechanisms (SRMs): 
the forces that reproduce a particular pattern of choices and
actions over time, and hence sustain it (Schreyögg and Sydow
2011).3
Once a specific IS path has emerged and is consolidated,
organizations might face strong inertia (Polites and Karahanna
2012).  As a result, when organizations are trapped in the
existing IS path and at the same time must embark on an alter-
nate IS path (e.g., implement a new technology), they need to
break into the current IS path.  According to organizational
path theory, organizations can break away from the estab-
lished path by “interrupting the logic and the specific energy
of the self reinforcing mechanisms” (Sydow et al. 2009, p.
702).  Although organizational actors are influenced by his-
torical choices and actions, they at the same time can “deviate
from path-dependent behaviors” (Lyytinen and Newman
2008, p. 606).
Five streams of research provide insights into how an estab-
lished organizational path can be broken by ceasing a specific
SRM (see Table 1).4  A first stream draws upon human
behavior to consider the indwelling SRM (Polanyi 1966): 
The more actors interact with an IS, the less they pay attention
to its details,thereby gradually pushing the details of tasks and
objects to the background.  Users can economize on their
limited cognitive and attentional capabilities, particularly in
dealing with complex information systems.  Certain break-
downs in the flows of actions (Bhattacherjee 2001) can cease
indwelling and bring the details of the system back to the
center of actors’ attention (Simon 1977).
A second stream of research considers the legitimization
SRM:  The more widely an IS is accepted as an appropriate
system, the more widely it will be accepted and used by other
organizational actors (Sydow et al. 2009).  Delegitimization
(Oliver 1992; Scott 2001) can be triggered by functional
failures and political dissension (Nicholson and Sahay 2009),
leading users to stop seeing the legacy IS as adequate.
Delegitimization can also be triggered by implementing a new
IS whose logic conflicts with that of the legacy system.  For
instance, the logic of integrated, standard automation that
underlies ERP systems can delegitimize the fragmented,
flexible automation logic behind traditional office automation
systems (Wagner et al. 2011).  Organizational actors can acti-
vely delegitimize an organizational path (Garud et al. 2011),
for example by “avoiding institutional monitoring and sanc-
tioning,” “not selecting institutional practices/selecting
others,” “attacking the legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness of
an institution,” and “undermining institutional mechanisms”
(Battilana and D’Aunno 2009, p. 48).
A third research stream focuses on the learning SRM:  The
more organizational actors know about the legacy IS, the
more effectively and efficiently they will use it (Robey et al.
2002).  Studies suggest that criticizing beliefs and assump-
tions regarding the established technologies and routines
(Wang et al. 2008) can disrupt the established mindset and
trigger deeper learning (Argyris 1977) and unlearning (Hed-
berg 1981).  Hence, mechanisms such as frame-breaking and
sense-breaking (Aula and Mantere 2013; Lawrence and
Maitlis 2005) are important to shake the taken-for-granted
mindsets about the IS practices (Vlaar et al. 2008).
A fourth research stream focuses on the resource comple-
mentarity SRM:  The more resources are allocated to and
aligned with a certain IS, the more value organizations can
generate from this complementarity (Keil 1995).  For
instance, the literature on IS project de-escalation (Flynn et al.
2009; Montealegre and Keil 2000) suggests that the forces for
continuing an IS project can override the forces for discon-
tinuing it because of the expectation that further resource
allocation can turn the project around.  Therefore, reducing
the investment of economic resources (Mähring et al. 2008)
may help organizations eliminate the resource complemen-
tarity mechanism.
A fifth research stream focuses on the routinization SRM: 
The more widely an IS is used, the lower the coordination
cost, therefore, the greater the tendency to adhere to the same
3Economists formalize SRM through “increasing return” on repeated courses
of actions (Arthur 1989).  In the language of system theory (Maruyama
1963), SRMs are known as “positive loops.”
4We reviewed the literature iteratively through concepts that implied how
various SRMs that underlie an organizational (IS) path can be discontinued: 
deinstitutionalization, disrupting habits and routines, de-escalation of com-
mitments, unlearning, etc.
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Table 1.  Summary of Literature Regarding the Breaking of Organizational (IS) Path
Self-Reinforcing Mechanism Ceasing Mechanisms 
Indwelling (behavioral):  The more actors work with an IS,
the less they pay attention to its details, and become more
easily engaged with it.
• Breakdown in the flow of actions (Butler and Gray 2006;
Polanyi 1966)
Legitimization (political):  The more widely an IS is
accepted as an appropriate system, the more widely will it
be accepted and followed by other organizational actors.
• Delegitimization and Deinstitutionalization (Berente and
Yoo 2012; Nicholson and Sahay 2009; Oliver 1992; Sahay
et al. 2010; Scott 2001) 
Learning (cognitive):  The more organizational actors
know and learn about the legacy IS, the more effectively
and efficiently will they use it.
• Deep, critical reflection (Argyris 1977) to question and
criticize established IS beliefs (Wang et al. 2008)
Resource complementarity (material):  The more
resources are allocated to and aligned with an IS, the more
value organizations can get from it.
• De-escalation of commitment to IS projects (Flynn et al.
2009; Mähring et al. 2008; Montealegre and Keil 2000)
Routinizing (economic):  The more widely an IS is used,
the lower the cost of coordination; therefore, the greater the
tendency to adhere to the same way of using it.
• (Intending to) stop the usage of an IS (Brook et al. 2015;
Whittle et al. 2011)
• Disrupting the flow of IS routines and habits (Polites and
Karahanna 2013)
way of using it (Polites and Karahanna 2013).  While in-
dwelling concerns gradually not paying attention to the
known details, routinization concerns the gradual process of
acting according to the way things have been done before.  In
this way, some studies examine how the day-to-day routines
and habits associated with an established IS can be disrupted,
for instance, via interference and distraction (Polites and
Karahanna 2013).  In particular, the embedded actors can
intentionally decide not to continue a routinized course of
action (Brook et al. 2015; Whittle et al. 2016).
To summarize, organizational path theory provides a powerful
conceptual framework for studying IS discontinuance.  First,
the concept of organizational path allows us to understand
legacy IS as an established pattern of choices and actions that
tends to continue due to historical commitments.  Second, the
concept of SRMs conceptualizes the driving forces of an
established path as ongoing cycles of actions and choices
(Garud et al. 2010).  Therefore, we can explain the discon-
tinuance process through the actions that cease different
SRMs.  Third, organizational path theory provides a process
ontology that enables us to examine the temporality of path-
breaking actions and interactions.  Fourth, organizational path
theory allows us to integrate the various theoretical explana-
tions regarding how various SRMs can be ceased.  As shown
above, each of the five streams of research focuses on a
separate SRM—legitimization, learning, complementarity,
indwelling, and routinization—thereby assuming that ceasing
one and each SRMs can be independently pursued.  Yet, this
assumption is not valid when we note the interdependent
nature of legacy IS.
Research Method
Empirical Settings
To examine the discontinuance process, we followed a mul-
tiple case study design (Yin 2002).  We focused on a major
replacement of the operating system and the products running
on top of it in four software vendor firms that develop and sell
office automation products.  This context offers a rich setting
for studying IS discontinuance because the old systems had to
be removed rather than partially modified.  Various socio-
technical elements being replaced were at the core of the
legacy IS:  production technologies (e.g., testing platforms
and the designs, codes, and modules for developing their
products), production and support routines (e.g., debugging
procedures), employees’ skills (e.g., designers), and asso-
ciated products and services.
We focused on the discontinuance process inside the four
vendor firms.  For confidentiality, we call the companies
SmallCo (small), MedCo (medium-sized), LargLenient
(large), and LargStrict (large).  See Table 2 for a summary of
cases.  We considered their clients as part of the discontin-
uance context.  Examining IS discontinuance in four cases
that are all exposed to similar economic, industrial, and tech-
nological environments allowed us to more accurately
examine the effect of the legacy IS conditions in shaping the
discontinuance process (Tsoukas 2009).  The cases enabled us
to examine how the process differently unfolded depending
on the commitments that organizations have to and the inter-
dependences involved in the legacy IS.
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SmallCo:  Private, small (40).* founded in 1991
• Focused on document management application, as the primary
product, to a wide range of private and public organizations
• Mainly young university graduates (average age of 27)
• Friendly, informal atmosphere, with open culture to new technological
changes
• Flat structure around production, test & support, sales & marketing,
finance & administration divisions
Limited:  A small team
of experts to serve
around 10 clients 
Limited:  A single,
separate document
management product
MedCo:  Private, medium-sized (100),* founded in 1988
• Focused strategy (after 2000) on document management application,
mainly to large, public clients
• A mixture of young (70%) and seasoned experts (30%)
• Rather informal climate based on interpersonal trust and shared
values among managers and employees, with centralized decision
making among top managers and key experts
• Strategy of avoiding hasty technological changes to provide stable
and reliable service to the clients
• Structured around production, test & support, sales & marketing,
finance & administration divisions
Moderate to extensive: 
Around 100 clients
and the strategy to
admit their requests;
internal specialization
in legacy domains 
Limited:  A single,
separate document
management product
LargStrict:  Private, large (900),* founded in 1988
• Diversified enterprise applications and gradually customized into
industry-specific solutions (more than 45 applications) for all types of
clients (small and large, public and private)
• Specialized structure around technical departments
• Internalizing the design and production activities and externalizing
support activities to around 20 spin-offs
• Structure around product management, internal systems, sales and
marketing, training, consultancy, client support divisions




power to force termin-
ating and externalizing
legacy IS support






LargLenient:  Private, large (450),* founded in 1987 by a group of 12
experts in developing manufacturing information systems
• Diversified products (18 enterprise applications), transformed into
customizable integrated solution (ERP) for various industries
• Specialized structure around R&D, production, quality assurance,
client support, marketing and sales, finance, and branches 
• Pursuing technological leadership with extensive R&D projects
Extensive, unavoid-






10 core and 100
customized products
*Number of full-time employees in 2009.
Organizational commitment refers to the amount of specia-
lized resources (e.g., personnel, products, services, financial
resources) that companies devoted to support the legacy
systems and products for their clients.  In fact, the discon-
tinuance process was completed often when the last client had
migrated into the new system and/or the software vendor
provided no more support for the legacy products (see Table
2 for the organizational commitments in each case).
Technological interdependence is present when changes in
one component in the legacy system (e.g., data field of a data-
base) require changes in some other components (e.g., a code
module).  In our context, the degree of interdependence
increased when companies were developing multiple products
that were interdependent in terms of supporting each other’s
data and functions.  Both LargLenient and LargStrict had
developed several products that were designed to work as an
integrated solution, thus having extensive interdependences
between codes, databases, functions, and configurations. 
These interdependences are exacerbated when they have been
embedded into the products that are sold to numerous clients
(see Table 2).
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Data Collection
The fieldwork took 18 months, from March 2008 to Septem-
ber 2009.  We extracted the story of the replacements, with
focus on the legacy systems.  First, we captured the back-
ground of the companies and the replacements through 16
exploratory interviews (on average, 40 minutes per interview)
with former managers, current employees, clients, and indus-
trial association heads.  We also examined public documents
regarding the companies’ backgrounds, products and services,
and relations with clients.  Having all companies in the same
market and facing similar technological replacements facili-
tated exploring their business and technological background.
Second, we zoomed in on capturing the story of the replace-
ment in each company.  We ran 33 interviews (average 60
minutes per interview) with managers and technical experts
in the four companies to extract the chronology of events,
decisions, actions, and changes related to the established
systems.  All interviews (except two exploratory ones) were
voice recorded and transcribed.  We used a semi-structured
interview protocol, consisting of three parts:  (1) under-
standing the case background, (2) describing the replacement
process, and (3) eliciting the discontinuance story by focusing
on the technological components, products, routines, and
roles.  We asked about the actions they took concerning the
discontinuance of the established systems as well as their pur-
poses and consequences.  We covered informants with posi-
tive, negative, and neutral positions toward the replacements.
For each company, we also examined various documents to
understand the company’s history, its products and tech-
nologies, internal and external relations, and its plans and
change decisions.  These documents enabled us to compl-
ement and validate the interviews (see Table 3).
Data Analysis Process
We analyzed data through four steps (see Table 4).  First, we
constructed the story of IS discontinuance in each case to map
who (e.g., programmers, HRM manager, or marketing
manager) did what (e.g., calling a meeting to discuss the
shortcomings of the MS-DOS technology), when (e.g., after
receiving a client request for a major feature), and for what
purposes (e.g., to limit learning new techniques related to the
old technology), leading to what consequences regarding the
progression of IS discontinuance (e.g., triggered a new round
of efforts to transfer legacy data).  In developing the stories,
we focused on the legacy IS and the elements such as the
products and services, relevant actors, technological objects,
and the organizational routines and procedures shaped around
these old systems.  Each story provided an integrated under-
standing of events and actions that constituted IS discontin-
uance process and the external factors such as clients’
requests (Langley 1999).  
Second, to explain each discontinuance process, we examined
when and how various SRMs (see Table 1) were enacted.  In
so doing, we mapped the progression of the IS discontinuance
process in each case and examined how various SRMs were
ceased in some situations and interestingly were intensified in
others.  We also coded how ceasing and/or intensifying cer-
tain SRMs affected the cessation or intensification of the
other SRMs over time.  This way, we accounted for the inter-
actions that emerged during the process.  The result showed
four distinct processes of IS discontinuance, that they varied
based on which and when various SRMs were enacted
(described in the following section and summarized in Figures
1–4).
Third, we examined the four discontinuance processes to
make sense of when various discontinuance actions took
place, how they were triggered by certain decisions and
external events, and how they interacted over time.  Through
an iterative process, we identified four common sets of inter-
related actions—we call them discontinuance phases—each
of which captures a specific temporal pattern of ceasing and/
or intensifying a set of SRMs with a distinct impact on the
progression of IS discontinuance process.  The identified
phases are
(1) Realization:  the legacy IS is critically scrutinized, yet
still remains as the dominant IS
(2) Reversion:  the legacy IS is further developed to cope
with new expectations
(3) Handover:  the momentum of the legacy IS is leveraged
to nurture the new IS path
(4) Marginalization:  the development and usage of the
legacy IS is gradually reduced
For each phase, we coded for (1) the triggering events, (2) the
actions that ceased or intensified SRMs, and (3) the inter-
actions within each phase (see Tables 6–9 and Tables A1–A4
in Appendix A for more details).  We observed that the phases
are not linear or sequential, rather discontinuance often
emerges as an iterative process.  Thus, we examined the inter-
actions between them (see Table 9 and Table A5) for more
details).
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Table 3.  Summary of Collected Data
Data Sources and Information Items Contributions to Empirical Findings
Exploratory interviews (Total 16 interviews, on average 40 minutes)
• SmallCo:  three interviews with industrial association heads (3)*
• MedCo:  three interviews with the former manager (1) and
industrial association heads (2)
• LargLenient:  four interviews with the former manager (1),
industrial association heads (2), and clients (1)
•  LargStrict:  four interviews with industrial association heads (2)
and clients (2)
To explore (1) the company background, (2) the story
of the technological replacements, and (3) the context
of technological replacements (e.g., economics, indus-
trial, and regulatory context, external relations, their
clients, and their market positions, and their conditions
regarding organizational commitments and techno-
logical interdependences)
Formal interviews (Total:  33 interviews, on average 1 hour)
• SmallCo:  eight interviews with top managers (3), technical
managers (3), and experts (2)
• MedCo:  eight interviews with top managers (3), technical
managers (3), and experts (2)
• LargLenient:  eight interviews with top managers (3), technical
managers (2), experts (2), and clients (1)
• LargStrict:  nine interviews with top managers (3), technical
managers (2), experts (2), and clients (2)
To capture (1) the chronology of events in the discon-
tinuance process, around tasks, actors, technologies,
and structures, (2) actions applied to the established IS
path, by exploring actors and their beliefs, views, posi-
tions in the replacement process; main decisions and
rationales behind each; discussions, controversies,
and agreements, and (3) the practical tensions and
how they were dealt with
Documents
Documents on corporate websites; product specifications and
technical descriptions; intranet pages on processes, routines,
regulations, messages from the managers; support manuals and
rules; contracts with clients and providers; termination letters to
the clients; clients feedback; and R&D plans and procedures
To capture (1) background of the companies and the
technological replacements, (2) formal actions and
decision during IS discontinuance, and (3) the out-
comes of IS discontinuance actions 
Fourth, we identified similarities and differences between the
cases depending on (1) whether some phases are present,
(2) when the phases start and finish, (3) what specific
sequences between the phases are important for the progres-
sion of IS discontinuance, and (4) which temporal iterations
(e.g., back and forth) between the phases that occur during
discontinuance.  We then relied on organizational path theory
(Schreyögg and Sydow 2011) to explain the progression of
the discontinuance process (horizontal axis in Figures 1–4) as
a function of ceasing and intensifying multiple interdependent
SRMs (vertical axis in Figures 1–4).  Once we mapped the
four temporal scenarios into our theoretical framework, we
examined how IS discontinuance was differently shaped by
the commitments and the interdependences of legacy IS.
During data collection and analysis, we adopted several
strategies to enhance the accuracy, validity and transparency
(Gibbert et al. 2008) of our study such as the triangulation of
data sources and informants (see Appendix B for more
details).
Findings
We first describe the four cases of IS discontinuance.  For
each case, we present a process account that explains how
discontinuance progressed as various SRMs were ceased
(downward movements in Figures 1–4) or intensified (upward
movements in Figures 1–4).
Case 1 (SmallCo):  Discontinuing an IS
with Limited Commitments
The first case of IS discontinuance relates to SmallCo, which
embarked on discontinuing a separate document management
product running on MS-DOS.  The company started working
on the product in 1991, selling it to about 10 clients.  A team
of four people designed and developed the product, and col-
laborated with three people giving support and maintenance
services.  The CEO coordinated these tasks and marketed the
product to new clients.  The CFOs held the position of finan-
cial officer, acting as a main shareholder, next to the CEO.
In early 1993, when the company was expanding its market,
the CEO and the technical experts realized that there was no
reason for investing further in MS-DOS technology since MS-
Windows was already on the market.  This led the technical
team to reexamine the details of their existing production
tools and methodologies by scrutinizing their functions and
shortcomings.  Interestingly, many of the discussions ap-
peared to be novel even for the designers and developers who
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Table 4.  Analysis in Process
had been immersed in MS-DOS for several years.  For them,
many technological features had become taken for granted
and scarcely noticed, especially the basic assumptions
regarding data storage and communication protocols.
The technical team and the CEO had discussions about which
aspects of MS-DOS and the “stuff that they designed and
implemented based on it” such as the code, testing algorithms,
and conceptual designs, were becoming obsolete and should
be abandoned, and which were still viable and should be
retained.  Telling the viable and obsolete aspects apart was
crucial because the young developers were eager to quickly
jump forward to the new technology and discredit the entire
old technology and the related “stuff,” even though the basic
design of the existing system was still relevant for imple-
menting the MS-Windows system.  Besides, it took more than
a year to convince the financial officer that the current
demand for MS-DOS products would not last long because he
had limited knowledge of technological trends and was
influenced by the fact that “the products work and clients are
asking for them.”
As a turning point, in early 1994, the financial officer and the
CEO agreed to split their shares:  The CEO kept the brand of
the old product and the financial officer kept the license and
maintenance contracts and created a new company.  This
triggered the second discontinuance phase through which
SmallCo gradually marginalized the legacy systems and
products.  One of the senior developers and two support staff
left SmallCo to join the financial officer’s company.  SmallCo
redirected most of the clients’ support requests to their partner
company, although in a few cases, they helped them fix the
bugs.  The limited client base allowed SmallCo to start the
new document management product as a totally distinct
product:
In the DOS shift, we had an easy job to simply start
a whole new product.  For a few clients who used
our old system, a small fraction of their legacy data
that could be reused in the new systems were re-
entered to the new systems, as if they did not exist it
in the old products.  The only thing we reused from
old system was its brand, which helped us promote
the new product (the CEO of SmallCo).
As Figure 1 shows, the discontinuance at SmallCo was a
straightforward process through which the legacy products,
technologies, routines, and actors were gradually marginalized.
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Figure 1.  Discontinuing an IS with Limited Commitments (SmallCo)
Case 2 (MedCo):  Discontinuing an IS
with Extensive Commitments
The second case of IS discontinuance relates to MedCo,
which had developed a document management product run-
ning on MS-DOS in 1988.  The company had a team of 15
developers devoted to MS-DOS and a team of 20 people
providing support, both managed by the Technical Manager,
one of the three founders of the company.  He was also active
in promoting products to new clients and managing relations
with approximately 50 clients.  Most of the clients were large,
public organizations that MedCo tried to please:  “We do even
more than what is needed to delight our clients” (Technical
Manager).
In 1995, discussions about MS-Windows arose, especially
among some designers who had recently joined MedCo.  The
Technical Manager arranged for a set of informal, open
discussions in his team on:  “Are we sitting on dangerous
ground, I mean MS-DOS?” Given the range of tools, method-
ologies, and products developed on MS-DOS, it took more
than a year to determine which of them had or would become
obsolete.  However, the general tendency of the senior experts
and the managers was to consider most of the legacy tech-
nology and processes as viable since they had developed
strong skills related to MS-DOS.
In parallel, the Technical Manager and the CEO had been
concerned about the lack of product and market focus, feeling
that they were “carrying too many melons in their hands.”  In
late 1996, they decided to take advantage of the shift from
MS-DOS to MS-Windows “as an excuse to kill many other
products and get focused on the core document management
product” (the CEO), for which they had their main market
share.  This decision led a group of young, newly hired devel-
opers to discredit the current product, production tools, and
routines, partly through the argument that they were based on
an outdated technology.  As a result, they became overly criti-
cal of MS-DOS and eager to move forward to MS-Windows.
Although the managers and most of the technicians realized
the shortcomings of their existing systems, they still had to
reap economic revenue from selling and supporting their
legacy products since their clients continued to demand sup-
port services.  In addition, the new product was still not ready,
and the managers had grave doubts about when it could be
implemented due to the instability of early technological
developments.  Hence, there was a risk of too early a depar-
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ture from MS-DOS by some technicians who were eager to
jump forward.
In response, for three years the Technical Manager and the
heads of the technical teams actively engaged in relegiti-
mizing their legacy systems and in improving them to cope
with new client expectations.  This was challenging because
internal teams had already discredited the base technologies.
Careful reframing of the legacy systems and sometimes
decoupling the internal technical discussions from external
marketing promotions was required:
In the last months, we have had meetings with our
designers and programmers on the limitations of the
MS-DOS systems and all the opportunities we are
missing for accessing the systems in a real-time
manner.  But, yesterday, I had a demo session for a
client who was interested in buying our old docu-
ment management.  Like other demo sessions, I took
Mike, one of my senior technical fellows, to the
demo session, mainly to talk about the technical fea-
tures.  I generally pitched the current product.  Then
I passed the discussion over to Mike, who was sitting
just opposite me on the other side of the table.  Influ-
enced by the past weeks’ discussions, he suddenly
became critical and talked about the limitations of
MS-DOS.  I was very lucky that I managed to
quickly tread on his toes without being noticed by
others, to prevent him from destroying the image of
our products (Marketing Manager)
Furthermore, the exposure to the shortcomings of the legacy
systems stimulated a range of new development projects to
enhance the capabilities of the old products and cope with
new expectations and needs.  As a result, specialized teams
faced a new surge of tasks to learn more in order to improve
the old systems.  Sometimes these learning projects were
extended beyond the normal change requests because clients
were requesting that the features MS-Windows was promising
be implemented in the old systems.  In addition, the
experienced MS-DOS folks were also eager to push the
boundaries of the current technology and learn new ways to
make it comparable with the new technology.  A senior
project manager at MedCo commented:
When we developed DOS systems, many of our
clients started using new LaserJet printers.  But in
the MS-DOS environment, there was no built-in
driver for these printers.  This made us go back to
our DOS systems and learn even more about how
DOS operates signals that can communicate with
these printers.  This actually made us learn even
more than we knew before, because we had to care-
fully examine the signals that are specific to DOS
protocols.
In 2001, the new MS-Windows based document management
system was ready, and MedCo started marginalizing the MS-
DOS based legacy systems by limiting their major changes: 
“changes that required further developing our capabilities in
some old domains” (Production Manager of MedCo).  Exter-
nally, the support team helped clients gradually replace their
legacy system with the new one.  Internally, for fresh experts
it was just fun to move to MS-Windows.  Yet for others with
long experience in MS-DOS, it was extremely challenging
because the shift had made almost their entire expertise obso-
lete.  Accordingly, the company helped them move to other
companies where they could find positions related to their
expertise.
Nevertheless, marginalizing MS-DOS took more than 3 years
because MedCo had to frequently update the legacy systems
to address its clients’ requests, even long after stopping
support contracts:  “It was an open, never-ending phase,
meaning that you should be ready to go back and fix their
issues” (the support team head of MedCo).
Case 3 (LargStrict):  Discontinuing a
Set of Interdependent IS with
Extensive Commitment
LargStrict was the second largest software company in the
national market, selling 10 core office automation products
and 45 customized versions to more than 200 clients.  The
products were interdependent to support each other’s data, to
act as the modules of a comprehensive office automation solu-
tion.  In 1993, LargStrict recognized the trend toward MS-
Windows.  Many designers and programmers started looking
into the shortcomings of MS-DOS regarding how to make
systems faster through parallel processing and more attractive
through new user interfaces.
However, the head of the production department had a more
fundamental concern:
For me, the basic problem is that our products are
like pieces that have been glued to each other; yet
they are not inherently designed as an integrated
total solution.
In late 1994, he managed to convince the CEO (who was a
former production manager) and most of his senior designers
to take advantage of MS-Windows for discontinuing MS-
DOS systems.  Yet it proved difficult to distinguish between
viable and obsolete aspects that were interdependent, espe-
150 MIS Quarterly Vol. 43 No. 1/March 2019
Mehrizi et al./Unpacking the Process of IS Discontinuance
Figure 2.  Discontinuing an IS with Extensive Commitments (MedCo)
cially because being viable or obsolete was, to a large extent,
dependent on “other interconnected pieces with which, for
instance, our current testing platform should work” (a senior
designer).
In 1995, LargStrict launched a parallel production line to
develop new integrated products on MS-Windows, while
continuing the development and support of MS-DOS systems.
Given the extensive client base and the still-growing revenue
stream from the legacy products, the Production Manager and
the heads of the technical teams actively encouraged working
on MS-DOS, especially for many programmers and designers
who perceived it as an inferior task compared with working
on the new systems.
The development of new products was delayed 3 years more
than the initial expectation; in total, it took 7 years to develop
the new products.  The delay was mainly due to the com-
plexity of designing the new products in such a way that they
supportd the legacy data and functions of the old products
“and their historical interdependences,” said the Production
Manager.  He continued, “We had more constraints than
opportunities, as if we had to replicate the same old monster
in the new product designs.”  Although it was challenging,
LargStrict managed to resist many major change requests to
the legacy products in the last 2 years before launching the
new products.  This helped them reduce further complications
in the new product designs.  As noted by the LargStrict
Product Manager,
It is not only the general data and functionalities
that have to be transferred to the new products;
every small update and change we now do on the
legacy IS needs to be considered for migrating data
and functionalities to the new systems.
In 2000, the new products were developed, yet there still was
a major imperative:  developing gateways and convertors to
automatically migrate the data from legacy systems and map
their functions to the new products.  Transferring data and
functions from a set of interdependent legacy products to a set
of interdependent new products was additionally challenging
since it required not only transferring single pieces of data,
but also examining and replicating those interdependences in
the new systems:  “It is like you want to move all the pieces
of furniture in your house to the new house while keeping
them connected” (the Production Manager).  This in turn
required deeper learning on MS-DOS for developing and
supporting gateways, which in turn, delayed the discontin-
uance for nearly a year.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 43 No.1/March 2019 151
Mehrizi et al./Unpacking the Process of IS Discontinuance
Figure 3.  Discontinuing a Set of Interdependent IS with Extensive Commitments (LargStrict)
Eventually, in 2002, LargStrict started marginalizing MS-
DOS by setting a strict deadline for their clients to replace
their products with the new ones.  The company benefitted
from its strong bargaining power to resist the extension of
support contracts.  Beginning in 2002 and mainly during
2003, LargStrict appointed its HR manager to develop a net-
work of more than 15 spin-offs by encouraging their MS-DOS
specialists to create their own start-ups.  The company had
pursued this strategy since its establishment as a way to re-
main agile, while growing in terms of the market and product
portfolio.  In this way, the company redirected the support
requests to the spin-offs; it also managed to speed up the tran-
sition of a considerable number of experts who were still far
from ready to work on the new systems, having learned little
about them, and sometimes having quite a bit of difficulty in
giving up the wealth of expertise they had acquired.  Figure
3 summarizes the discontinuance process at LargStrict.
Case 4 (LargLenient):  Discontinuing
an Integrated Legacy IS with
Extensive Commitments
Since its establishment in 1987, LargLenient had developed
an integrated set of office automation products running on
MS-DOS.  LargLenient grew into the second largest software
company in the national market by focusing on large clients. 
Since 1987, LargLenient developed 18 office-automation
products based on MS-DOS, comprising more than 50
customizable modules used by around 700 clients from 20
different industries.
Since the company proactively investigated the newest tech-
nological trends, in 1993 it opened a major R&D project to
compare MS-DOS with MS-Windows.  Meanwhile, the Prod-
uction Manager and his team had considered the possibility of
a complete redesign of their products to make them more
customizable.  Later, in 1994, both the Production Manager
and the R&D Manager agreed that the transition from MS-
DOS to MS-Windows be used for a complete redesign of their
office automation products.
LargLenient had invested in developing MS-DOS systems
through specialized design, production, testing, and support
teams.  For instance, one team was dedicated solely to opti-
mizing applications through parallel processing.  They already
mimicked the idea of parallel processing and incorporated it
in their product designs, “as if we tweaked MS-DOS systems
to execute parallel processes,” said the R&D manager.  He
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continued, “We were so specialized in MS-DOS that at the
time that Windows came, we already had almost all its new
features implemented in a more efficient way by MS-DOS.”
Although this helped the company support the legacy systems,
it appeared to become problematic if it were pushed too hard,
“leading us to be buried in the MS-DOS grave, not because
we were not capable of adopting Windows, but rather be-
cause we were too capable in developing MS-DOS.”
In early 1996, the company launched new R&D and produc-
tion lines to develop new products, while keeping most of
their current technical teams active on the maintenance and
support of MS-DOS systems for about 7 years.  The com-
pany’s strategy of accepting almost all client requests
demanded even more extensive support and development of
the legacy systems than before because clients were now
asking for MS-Windows’ features:  “Clients’ systems are our
systems!  They tell us when we can fully drop DOS” (the
Production Manager).
From 1996 to 2000, LargLenient straddled two lines of
activities in parallel:  (1) development and support of MS-
DOS products, and (2) designing the new MS-Windows
systems.  For two years, the teams were carefully isolated
from one another by locating them in distinct departments and
even on different floors to prevent “injecting the wrong way
of thinking and acting to the new systems” (R&D manager).
Yet, soon, the company realized that a third team was crucial
to take care of designing and implementing tools to migrate
legacy data to the new products and map their functionalities:
the handover team.  The extensive technological interdepen-
dences required examining many technological components
to ensure that data and processes running on the legacy IS
were properly transferred to the new system.
Therefore, since 2002, three production and support depart-
ments were active in parallel.  Since the company was open
to implementing even major changes to the legacy systems,
the Production Manager and a team of senior experts were
active to ensure that 
We [would] consistently coordinate three major,
complex lines of activities:  (1) supporting and up-
dating the old systems; (2) designing the new sys-
tems in such a way that we can comply with the
backward compatibility of the data and main func-
tions; and (3) the transition of the data and function-
alities of the old to the new systems.  Interestingly,
for several years, we had a large number of our
experienced engineers working on the gateways and
connections between the old and new; even compar-
able with our teams dedicated to the new systems”
(the R&D Manager).
The company had to first think of designing gateways for
transferring the legacy data before designing and imple-
menting a specific part of the new systems:
Many times, we had a very brilliant design for the
database of the new systems to make it faster.  How-
ever, we had to put it on hold, ask our transition
team to learn even more about DOS to see if they
could find a feasible solution to transfer legacy data.
Otherwise, we could simply create nice products
that none of our clients would use (Production
Manager).
In 2002, the new products were implemented for the new
clients, and the negotiations with traditional clients to replace
their existing products were successfully concluded.  Yet,
LargLenient did not force a strict transition upon clients, but
instead was lenient to keep the legacy systems running
parallel to the new systems through supporting the gateways.
Nevertheless, the company realized that maintaining gateways
for an extended period could backfire.  Gateways had to be
deployed temporarily only to hand over the data and functions
from legacy to new systems.  Therefore, LargLenient adopted
two strategies:  They fixed specific timelines for the removal
of gateways, and they built one-way gateways that mainly
transferred data from the legacy to the new system but not the
other way around, thus limiting opportunities to use the
legacy system via the new system.
The full discontinuance of the legacy system took more than
10 years (1995–2005).  For each set of clients, LargLenient
had to gradually reduce their reliance on legacy systems
through carefully handing over their legacy data and reducing
the usage of the legacy systems.  In fact, there was no clear
end to the discontinuance process despite having no formal
support obligation after 2005.  As a result, the company
learned how to become more efficient in “going back,
opening the wounds, fixing the old systems, and not getting
stuck there,” for example, by asking their very experienced
engineers to take care of the legacy systems requests: 
I never ask junior engineers to fix the MS-DOS
systems, they may go there and never come back!
Although it is quite expensive, I always ask our
senior designers to quickly fix the old systems (head
of support team).
Table 5 summarizes the four discontinuance cases. 
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Figure 4.  Discontinuing an Integrated Legacy IS with Extensive Commitments (LargLenient)
Table 5.  Summary of the Four IS Discontinuance Cases
Case 1 (SmallCo):  Discontinuing an IS with limited organizational commitments (3 years)
• Relevant phases and iterations:  Discontinuance mainly involved realization and marginalization, with limited reversion
and handover since new IS was distinct from the legacy with limited support commitments.
• Practical challenges:  Convincing nontechnical fellows on the need to depart from legacy systems when they still provide
revenue
Case 2 (MedCo):  Discontinuing an IS with extensive organizational commitments (8 years)
• Relevant phases and iterations:  Discontinuance mainly involved realization, reversion and marginalization, especially
with many iterations between realization and reversion to avoid premature departure from the legacy IS and remain able
to meet extensive commitments; too early marginalization was hurting and needed; considerable iteration between
reversion and realization.
• Practical challenges:  Avoiding too early departure from legacy IS to ensure fulfilling legacy commitments
Case 3 (LargStrict):  Discontinuing a set of interdependent IS with moderate organizational commitments (11
years)
• Relevant phases and iterations:  Discontinuance involved realization, reversion, handover, and marginalization.  There
were many iterations between reversion and handover to ensure that historical interdependences were transferred to new
systems; yet a more straightforward marginalization with limited iteration back to reversion and handover.
• Practical challenges:  Designing new gateways to support historical data and their interdependences 
Case 4 (LargLenient):  Discontinuing a set of integrated legacy IS with extensive organizational commitments
(more than 13 years)
• Relevant phases and iterations:  The discontinuance process was a highly iterative process within and between the four
phases, especially with several cycles involving reversion, handover, and marginalization.  There seemed no clear-cut
end to the process due to the historical commitments.
• Practical challenges:  Balancing between fulfilling historical commitments and not being buried in the grave of legacy
systems.
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Discussion
Toward a Process Account
of IS Discontinuance
Our findings depict four generalizable discontinuance phases: 
realization, reversion, handover, and marginalization (see
Tables 6–9).  Depending on which phases, when, and the
interactions that emerged in the process, we can explain how
the discontinuance process can unfold differently.  We ob-
serve that two discontinuance phases are present in all cases: 
realization and marginalization.  In particular, the discontin-
uance process at SmallCo, where legacy IS involved limited
commitment and interdependences, consisted of merely these
two phases.  First comes realization, during which the legacy
IS is critically scrutinized, yet still remains as the dominant
IS.  During realization, the indwelling mechanism is under-
mined by scrutinizing the details of the legacy system.  In
addition, exposing the limitations of the legacy technologies,
products, and routines ceased their legitimacy.
Second comes marginalization, during which the develop-
ment and use of the legacy IS are gradually stopped. Margin-
alization involves ceasing to learn about the legacy system’s
technology, and de-routinizing the legacy IS by isolating the
technical teams and imposing social and material restrictions
on updating and using legacy technologies and products
(Table 7).
The presence of realization and marginalization phases in the
four cases confirms what the current literature suggests:  for
discontinuing legacy IS, we need to trigger the users’ and
managers’ intentions to stop using it (Furneaux and Wade
2011), disrupt users’ habits (Polites and Karahanna 2013), and
delegitimize legacy choices and actions (Sahay et al. 2010).
Nevertheless, the process does not merely consist of reali-
zation and marginalization.  As observed in Cases 2, 3, and 4,
when organizations have commitments to legacy IS, reversion
becomes a key phase, after realizing that legacy IS needs to be
discontinued, yet before engaging in marginalizing it (Table
8).  Reversion is not a failure of discontinuance but rather an
important phase for its progression, through which the
existing IS is further developed to cope with new expecta-
tions.  Counterintuitively, during reversion, the legitimization
and learning SRMs are intensified to prevent premature
discontinuance of the legacy IS before the new products, pro-
duction tools, routines, and expertise are properly developed.
When organizations have extensive commitments to a legacy
IS, ditching a system too early can lead to prematurely aban-
doning its viable aspects and failing to comply with organiza-
tional commitments.
As observed in Cases 3 and 4, when the legacy IS has inter-
dependences, an iconic handover phase emerges, through
which the momentum of the legacy IS is leveraged to nurture
the new IS (Table 9).  In particular, during handover, organi-
zations need to intensify learning on the legacy IS in order to
develop gateways for transferring the viable data into the new
system.  In our empirical cases, the gateways were imperative
to break the resource complementarity of the legacy IS by
moving viable resources (e.g., legacy data) to the new IS. 
Otherwise, not only might their clients revert back to the
legacy products, but also the new products would not gain
sufficient momentum to become dominant.  In other words,
temporarily intensifying the learning SRM was necessary to
cease the resource complementarity SRM, especially since the
legacy IS had extensive interdependences that had to be
understood and transferred to the new IS.
Moving from Case 1 to Case 4, we observe that the process
increasingly involves interactions between the various phases,
thus gradually opening opportunities for the progression of
the discontinuance process.  As summarized in Table 10, the
interactions enable us to explain how ceasing a specific SRM
can facilitate or hamper the cessation of other SRMs.
This is well illustrated in Case 4, where the successful com-
pletion of the discontinuance took many years and involved
many iterations between the reversion, handover, and margin-
alization phases.  These iterations were triggered by both
extensive commitments and interdependences involved in the
legacy IS.  First, given the organization’s historical invest-
ment in the legacy systems and the organization’s culture of
satisfying the clients, the discontinuance process was not
completed until the very last client was fully transferred into
the new system.  Second, the development of a wide range of
products to act as modules of an integrated solution resulted
in extensive technological interdependences.  Therefore, the
iteration between reversion and handover seems crucial to
ensure the changes made into one specific aspect of legacy
systems would be considered in the design of new products
and gateways.
How Process View Advances Our
Understanding of IS Discontinuance? 
A process view implies that we should seriously consider the
iterations within and between phases in explaining the pro-
gression of the discontinuance process.  Otherwise, separate
interventions to cease each SRM may fail to break the estab-
lished IS path.  Furthermore, the timing of acting on various
SRMs is pivotal for the progression of the discontinuance pro-
cess.  For instance, the reversion phase shows that a process
view is crucial to explain when ceasing a SRM that sustains
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Table 6.  Realization:  The Legacy IS Is Critically Scrutinized, Yet Still Remains as the Dominant IS
Theoretical Abstractions Empirical Observations
Triggers
• Technological changes
• Acquaintance with new IS 
• New requests by leading
clients
• The change in the base technology:  operating system and product
design architecture
• Often technical experts were leading to raise the flags of obsolesce
• New change requests due to new real clients’ needs and due to the




Scrutinizing legacy IS:  The
indwelling SRM is ceased as
more details of the legacy
systems are scrutinized
• Technical teams and middle managers and later top management
and sales and marketing made sense of the relative disadvantages
of legacy IS, compared with new IS
• Financial Managers often were reluctant to admit the obsolescence
of the established IS since they were still profitable for support
contracts
• Technical development teams were searching for the comparable
advantages and capabilities of the legacy IS in comparison with the
new IS
• Senior experts with high specialization in legacy IS were posing novel
questions about legacy IS
Discrediting the viability of
(parts of) legacy IS:  The
legitimization SRM is ceased
as more organizational actors
critically reflect on obsolete
aspects of legacy IS
• Product managers in discussion with technical teams were distin-
guishing between viable and obsolete aspects of legacy systems and
discussing the boundaries between them
• Forward jumpers were discrediting legacy systems by highlighting the
new technological opportunities and deficiencies of the legacy IS
• Marketing managers and agents were carefully decoupling between
internal and external legitimacy of the legacy systems
Interactions
Scrutinizing ö discrediting
• Paying attention to the detailed, technical characteristics and
examining various potential technological features that appeared to
be limiting the capacities and functions of the legacy IS
• Reopening the list of shortcomings of the technology that were
worked around and adjusted locally in past upgrades and
maintenance
Discrediting º scrutinizing 
• The discussion about the boundaries between old-viable and old-
obsolete required scrutinizing some detailed technological features
and aspects in more details (to see which aspect is really the
problematic aspect) 
Outcomes
• The limitations of legacy
technologies, tools, designs,
and routines are exposed
• Most of technical teams are
eager to jump forward to the
new systems 
• Widespread belief that MS-DOS has no future; so much so its
associated production technologies
• Divisions between technical teams with the attitude to quickly jump
forward and the more seasoned experts and managers who concern
their historical profession and the mid-term stability of the company,
respectively
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Table 7.  Marginalization:  The Development and Practicing of the Legacy IS Is Gradually Reduced 
Theoretical Abstractions Empirical Observations
Triggers
• The fear of keeping the legacy
IS next to new 
• High cost of maintaining legacy
systems 
• The stability of new products 
• Often after having it tested internally and the products successfully
launched for some clients
• Shrinking market specially for the cases that they had major delay in




Ceasing learning about legacy
IS:  The learning SRM is ceased
as the scope, depth, and
frequency of learning practices
related to legacy IS domains are
reduced
• Technical and HR managers gradually stopped R&D projects,
training, and hiring on the domains specific to legacy systems
• IS Product managers in negotiation with support teams were
carefully distinguishing between major and minor changes into the
systems based on their learning commitments
• Production and HR managers isolated legacy and new systems
teams and located them in distinct organizational units
• R&D and HR managers proactively prevented narrow specialization
in domains that might become obsolete quickly
De-routinizing legacy IS:  The
routinization SRMs is ceased as
the scope and frequency of
working on and with legacy
systems is limited 
• Marketing and Support managers specified clear deadlines for
terminating the support of legacy systems
• Support teams paralyzed the legacy systems in order not to be used
by clients that already adopted new systems
• HR managers helped some seasoned experts to move to other
companies where they could find a relevant position
• Production managers and support teams (when recommending to
clients) removed the technological objects (e.g., operating systems,
programming tools, and test tools) to prevent working on the legacy
systems
• Top managers (often CEOs) supported the teams of seasoned
experts who were not willing to move to new domains to create their
spin-offs
• Production managers and technical teams of legacy IS documented
the legacy systems to allow them move on to new systems teams
and for future occasional requests
Interactions
Ceasing learning º de-
routinization
• When systems were not developed further, clients have lower




• The fewer users and clients use a legacy system, the less is the
need for support and updating activities (thus less learning)
Outcomes
• Legacy technologies and
production tools and routines
have limited use
• Clients are migrated to the new
ones
• Terminated support contracts and support activities 
• No access to the legacy products and technologies both internally
and in the side of the clients
• Documents regarding how legacy systems can be supported in case
of emergencies
• Specifying teams of experts who act on occasional changes
requests to the legacy IS 
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Table 8.  Reversion:  Legacy IS Is Further Developed to Cope with New Requirements and Expectations
Theoretical Abstractions Empirical Observations
Triggers
• Ongoing requests from the
clients on the legacy 
• Not having new systems ready
• Risk of too early departure
from legacy systems
• Highly profitable and even growing demand regarding the support
contracts of the legacy IS, especially since they were still working
• Delays in developing the new systems especially when they were
technologically interdependent 
• The internal pressure from forward jumpers to quickly drop the




Relegitimizing legacy IS:  The
legitimization SRM is intensified
as more internal actors and
clients regard legacy systems as
still the viable solutions
• Product managers were promoting legacy IS as still viable solutions
in short-term
• Middle managers had to convince forward jumpers to not disregard
the entire legacy systems as obsolete
• Product managers and marketing agents were constantly
highlighting the relative advantages of legacy systems against the
immature versions of new technologies
Learning more about the
legacy IS:  The learning SRM is
intensified as deeper and more
learning efforts were devoted to
improve the legacy systems
• Seasoned, specialized experts were actively identifying the short-
comings of legacy systems and improve them in an effective way
• Senior experts in legacy IS re-discovered untapped potentials of
legacy systems and developed them
• Product managers and development teams launched new develop-
ment projects to improve the functionalities of legacy systems
Interactions
Relegitimizing º learning to
improve
• Knowing which aspects of the legacy IS are considered as viable
and thus can be and should be further improved meanwhile 
• Specifying the boundaries of learning to prevent over-learning in
obsolete domains
Learning to improve º
relegitimizing 
• The improvement of legacy IS makes it more as a viable solution to
be presented to the clients 
• The cost of learning on some basic domains prevents
delegitimizing them for the clients
Outcomes
• Further development of the
legacy products and
technologies
• A selective team of experts
dedicate to knowing and
supporting legacy products
• The tension between keeping a team of experts busying with
support and update of the legacy products and their willingness to
move on to the new systems
• New changes into the legacy IS need to be replicated/reconsidered
in the development of the new systems
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Table 9.  Handover:  The Momentum of the Legacy IS Is Leveraged to Nurture the New IS Path
Theoretical Abstractions Empirical Observations
Triggers
• The development of the new
systems and ensuring they are
stable 
• The shrinking market on the
legacy systems
• Often after having it tested internally and the products successfully
launched for some clients
• Shrinking market specially for the cases that they had major delay




Learning more about legacy IS
to connect legacy and new IS: 
The learning SRM is intensified
as efforts and experts were
increasingly devoted to learn
deeper about legacy IS to
design, implement and support
gateways for more clients
• Production managers and a selected team of highly skilled
developers who mastered both legacy and new IS domains
launched new development projects to connect legacy and new
systems by developing and deploying gateways
• Support teams were setting deadlines on using gateways for clients
• Technical developers with support team limited the functionalities of
gateways (e.g., making them one-way connections to the legacy
systems)
Reallocating viable resources
to new IS:  The resource com-
plementarity SRM is ceased as
human and economic resources
were reallocated from legacy to
new systems 
• HR managers integrated legacy IS teams into new IS teams to
leverage their common, basic knowledge
• HR managers in collaboration with technical managers defined
transitional tasks for seasoned experts of legacy IS to gradually
move to new IS teams
Interactions
Learning to connect legacy
and new º reallocating from
legacy to the new 
• Convertors transfer legacy data from legacy to new IS
• Gateways allow that many customers start working with the new
systems through and with the help of the legacy IS 
• Connecting legacy and new IS makes the two systems both
support the historical routines, roles, functions (backward
compatibility) which then allows organizations and their clients be
able to keep the same legacy of business processes and routines
and use them in the new systems 
Reallocating from legacy to
the new º learning to connect
legacy and new 
• Once the same users and same business processes, and same
functions and roles were transferred to the new IS, it requires that
legacy and new IS be more connected to bring all the related
legacy data and features (more need to develop gateways and
convertors)
Outcomes
• The legacy IS is connected to
the new IS to transfer legacy
data 
• Viable expertise and produc-
tion tools are reallocated to the
new IS
• Gateways are developed, tested, and implemented for clients to
convert their legacy data
• Old and new products are connected for the transition from the old
to the new systems
• Teams are retrained and transferred to new IS teams
• The further production and development of legacy products are
stopped
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Table 10.  Interactions and Feedback Relations Between Discontinuance Phases




Discrediting legacy IS »º
relegitimizing legacy IS
(Present in Cases 2–4; due to commitments)
• Knowing which aspects are old-obsolete helps relegitimizing the
other aspects that are old-viable
• Tension between discrediting some aspects, but not delegitimizing
the entire legacy IS 
Learning to maintain legacy º
discrediting legacy 
(Present in Cases 3 and 4; due to interdependencies)
• Discovering new shortcomings and how fundamental are some of




Learning to maintain the
legacy º learning to connect
legacy and new IS
(Present in Cases 3 and 4; due to interdependencies of legacy data)
• Deeper knowledge enables creating gateways (more at the funda-
mental levels of data structure compatibility and the consistency
with the different operating systems, and the capability to support
some specific business processes) 
Learning to connect legacy
and new IS º learning to
maintain the old
(Present in Cases 3 and 4; due to interdependencies of legacy data)
• Keeping legacy IS next to the new working stimulates further need
for maintenance of their interactions
• Deeper learning for creating gateways enhances the capability to




Reallocating from legacy to
new »º ceasing learning on
the old
(Present in Cases 3 and 4; due to interdependencies of legacy data)
• When the legacy data and functionalities is transferred, the support
activities can be stopped 
• Reallocating the technical teams to new IS development and





more about legacy IS to
maintain
(Present in Cases 4; due to interdependencies and commitments)
Failing to de-routinize legacy products brings back the need to learn
more about the old systems:  the customers keep asking as long as
they use it in action
When legacy IS is de-routinized, some occasional requests demands
organizations to relearning to maintain the legacy 
the legacy IS may and may not contribute to the progression
of IS discontinuance.  Sometimes ceasing a SRM too early
can harm the discontinuance process.
Moreover, our process account highlights various sequences
that are important for the progression of IS discontinuance. 
As illustrated in Case 3 (see Figure 3), the extensive techno-
logical interdependences required major efforts to hand over
the viable data and functionalities from the old to the new
system before the organization could engage in disrupting
users’ habits (Polites and Karahanna 2013) and motivate them
to stop using legacy IS (Furneaux and Wade 2011).  Other-
wise, the viable legacy elements (e.g., viable data and func-
tions) would not be properly transferred to the new IS, and the
organization would revert back to the legacy system.  This
can explain why, despite attempts to motivate and trigger
users to discontinue their use, legacy systems remain opera-
tive (Sahay et al. 2010).  Focusing on delegitimizing IS
choices and actions (Nicholson and Sahay 2009) or disrupting
certain IS routines (Polites and Karahanna 2013) may par-
tially and temporarily shake the IS path, yet may not result in
breaking the entire path if other SRMs are not ceased in a
timely manner.
Understanding Discontinuance as an
Ongoing, Distributed Process
As illustrated in Cases 3 and 4, IS discontinuance turns into
an ongoing and distributed process when the legacy systems
straddle multiple organizations (e.g., the vendor company, the
various providers who maintain the legacy systems, and the
wide range of clients who use the legacy products and ser-
vices), encompass various technological components (e.g., the
base technology and product and production technologies)
that are interconnected, and implicate a diverse range of rou-
tines that concern the development and usage of these
systems.
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This resembles today’s typical IS landscape of established
companies in various industries such as financial services,
manufacturing, and petrochemical, where some systems have
grown for decades by the gradual accumulation of additional
layers.  This entails that the latest technologies being imple-
mented are dependent on technological components that were
created decades ago, all working on the legacy of historical
data that is distributed across multiple systems.  In fact,
todays’ legacy systems are characterized through complex
interconnection between many heterogeneous components
(Polites and Karahanna 2012).  Nowadays, organizations face
complex, heterogeneous legacy systems that they constantly
evolve (Kelty and Erickson 2015) as new technologies are
used to modernize existing systems, new cloud applications
are required to work with the legacy data, and agile-developed
patches interconnect separate parts of the legacy landscape.
We showed that when legacy systems consist of multiple,
interconnected components, some owned by the focal organi-
zation and some others outside, handover becomes a key
phase, through which companies go back and forth between
the old and new systems to gradually reduce their commit-
ment on the old and develop the new path.  In addition, the
discontinuance process turns into an iterative and ongoing
process, as if the process is never concluded.
This has two theoretical insights.  First, in the case of distrib-
uted, heterogeneous legacy IS, it is likely that the discontin-
uance takes a long time, handover plays a central role, and we
discover emergent interactions between the phases.  Hence,
although the very specific temporal patterns that we observed
in the four cases may change from one case to another, the
four phases and their interactions can help us understand the
mechanisms driving the discontinuance process and which
underlying SRMs can explain the evolution of the discon-
tinuance process.
Second, we need to understand the discontinuance process
more as an ongoing evolutionary process than a complete end-
to-end one.  Therefore, organizations may face multiple on-
going discontinuance processes, running simultaneously, yet
each focusing on a specific part of the legacy landscape and
going through a specific phase each time.  In other words,
when legacy systems comprise a heterogeneous and evolving
ecology of systems, we need to consider an ongoing system of
discontinuance processes.
Understanding How IS Discontinuance Ad-
vances Breaking the Organizational Path
Our findings also contribute to the explanation of breaking the
established organizational path.  Organizational path theory
suggests that “the possibility of escaping from or breaking a
path depends very much on interrupting the logic and the
specific energy of the self-reinforcing patterns of the process
in question” (Sydow et al. 2009, p. 702).  Therefore, the
theory explains and predicts that for disrupting an established
IS path, its underlying SRMs need to cease.  This is also
reflected in the current IS literature that explains IS discon-
tinuance through a set of separate actions that cease specific
SRMs such as routinization (Polites and Karahanna 2013),
learning (Wang et al. 2008), legitimization (Berente and Yoo
2012; Sahay et al. 2010), and resource compatibility (Flynn et
al. 2009).
Although this focus on each and every specific SRM is
important, it does not take into account how ceasing one SRM
influences ceasing other SRMs.  We observed that discontin-
uance involves phases through which ceasing one SRM
supports ceasing other SRMs.  Often interactions between
discontinuance phases are pivotal, especially when legacy IS
involves extensive interdependences and organizations have
multiple commitments to it (e.g., Cases 2–4).  In this way, we
contribute to the short list of empirical insights regarding how
the path-breaking process unfolds (Stache and Sydow 2014).
Nevertheless, we observed that to discontinue the legacy IS,
we need to temporarily intensify some of its SRMs in order to
cease other mechanisms.  For instance, during handover,
organizations need to intensify learning on the legacy IS to
create gateways that allow the migration of legacy data (to
cease resource complementarity SRM).  Unlike the prediction
of organizational path theory (Sydow et al. 2009), we show
that breaking an established IS path is not a function of
merely ceasing its SRMs, but also requires that certain SRMs
be temporarily intensified.  In fact, there are nonlinear, nega-
tive relations between the discontinuance actions:  to cease
some SRMs (e.g., resource complementarity), some other
SRMs (e.g., such as learning) need to be temporarily inten-
sified.  Our cross-case analysis shows the prediction of cur-
rent literature only holds under the conditions of limited
organizational commitment and limited technological inter-
dependences (see Case 1).  Yet an established IS path often
enjoys the condition of extensive organizational commitment
and/or technological interdependences (see Cases 2–4).
Under these conditions, focusing on only ceasing SRMs will
not necessarily result in breaking the overall IS path and may
even trigger premature and incomplete discontinuance.
Intensifying some SRMs to break the old IS path is different
from intensifying the SRMs to develop the new path (Stache
and Sydow 2014).  Accumulating momentum on the new path
(e.g., developing alternative systems) is necessary, but not
sufficient to break an established IS path, since there should
be mechanisms to reduce the momentum of the established IS
path and transfer its viable elements to the new one.  Other-
wise, the risk is that both the old and the new IS coexist and
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the dominance of the old compromises the development of the
new.
Discontinuing the Old to Innovate the New 
Our study underscores the importance of focusing on the old
side in the innovation process.  The literature on product and
technology innovation has documented the hampering role of
old routines (Polites and Karahanna 2013), dominant business
logic (Bettis and Prahalad 1995), and aging products and ser-
vices (Burgelman 1996), when they turn into core rigidities
(Gilbert 2005; Leonard-Barton 1992).  Known as the inno-
vator’s dilemma (Christenson 1997), the rigidities that stem
from the attachment to legacy products and technologies
prevent firms from remaining innovative.  These studies sug-
gest that firms need to actively sense and seize new oppor-
tunities, diversify their product and technological capabilities,
and when needed, marginalize the old products and tech-
nologies (Christensen and Raynor 2003; Henderson 2006).
For instance, the studies on de-escalation of IS projects
suggest actions that concern the realization and margina-
lization of the existing system (Flynn et al. 2009; Montealegre
and Keil 2000).
Our findings extend these suggestions by unpacking how the
old technologies, routines, and products can be discontinued
through an iterative process.  In particular, we showed that
both historical commitments and interdependences involved
in legacy technologies and products require some phases such
as revitalization and handover through which the old systems
are temporarily developed, rather than marginalized.  In fact,
marginalizing the legacy products and technologies too early
is risky, when legacy commitments still exist and when part
of the legacy systems can be leveraged for nurturing the new
systems.  We showed that the interconnected nature of digital
products and services implies that the commitments and inter-
dependences of legacy IS often go beyond the internal techno-
logical choices, routines, and structures that an organization
develops; but also involve the commitments that the organiza-
tion accumulates through the products and services that are
based on the legacy IS.  Aging products developed on legacy
systems often inherit a wide range of viable functions and
historical data on the client’s side and need to be transferred
to the new systems and products.
Therefore, our study on the discontinuance of legacy IS from
the vendor companies’ perspective also sheds light on how
organizations ditch their aging products.  We showed that
when the products and technologies are interdependent and
involve legacy commitments, the old and new sides have
complex relations.  In fact, discontinuance is not a separate
step before or parallel with innovating the new products and
technologies; rather, it is an embedded and ongoing part of
the very process of innovation.  This context seems to be
increasingly relevant due to the growing embeddedness of
digital technologies into products and services, where old
technologies and products are interconnected with new ones.
Insights for Managing the IS
Discontinuance Process
Practitioner discourse has begun, but needs to further
acknowledge the importance of IS discontinuance, especially
when organizational culture focuses managers’ attention
mostly toward adopting new systems.  Rapid technological
changes can worsen this situation if companies incompletely
marginalize their obsolete systems in their zeal to develop
new ones, thus resulting in huge, complex legacy IS, recog-
nized as “the ticking time-bomb” (Latham 2015).
Our findings suggest that in order for specific discontinuance
attempts to succeed, organizations should not be satisfied with
users’ intentions and decisions to discontinue but rather they
would need to go through an emergent, iterative process.  The
four phases and their interactions can be used as a process
guide to show the range of potentially relevant actions, the
challenges that need to be met at each moment, and the
nuanced back-and-forth iterations that prevent premature
discontinuance and reversion back to the old IS.
Discontinuing legacy IS requires extensive time and effort,
especially when organizations need to work out their histori-
cal commitments, carefully reexamine the legacy IS inter-
dependences, and mindfully transfer viable legacy elements
(e.g., legacy data) to the new IS.  Our cross-case analysis (see
Table 10) provides insights into managers’ decisions and
actions regarding which phases and interactions can be crucial
and what practices can be effective.
Boundary Conditions and
Future Research
Some boundary conditions and future research must be
acknowledged.  Although our cross-case study allowed us to
extract mechanisms regarding how the IS discontinuance pro-
cess emerges, further empirical studies can enrich our findings
by investigating the proposed mechanisms and extending
them under other conditions.  In particular, our empirical
cases focused on the discontinuance of core enterprise sys-
tems from the perspective of vendors.  In this sense, studying
discontinuance from the perspective of user organizations that
use multiple, interdependent systems from different vendors 
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can yield further insights.  Furthermore, the proliferation of
new IS sourcing models such as software-as-a-service may
require different discontinuance dynamics and challenges.
Although user organizations may be exempted from dealing
with obsolete technologies in these new sourcing models, they
still must deal with the obsolescence of their legacy organiza-
tional processes, structures, routines, and skills associated
with old technologies.  Likewise, the discontinuance process
in those cases might reveal additional tensions between
vendors and user organizations, especially because numerous
users simultaneously share a particular technological environ-
ment in which the decisions and actions of discontinuance by
one actor have immediate implications for others.
Finally, our focus on an old technology is relevant for various
traditional industries such as manufacturing, banking, trans-
portation, and national infrastructures where the core
operations and services are still based on such old, historical
systems.  This provides a rich context in which complex
interdependences and long-lasting historical commitments are
more visible.  Yet, future studies can explore the discon-
tinuance of more modern types of legacy systems.
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Appendix A
Coding for the Discontinuance Phases and Their
Interactions Across the Cases
Table A1.  Realization
Realization SmallCo MedCo LargStrict LargLenient
Triggers
• Acquaintance with new IS 
• Technological changes
• New requests by leading clients





logical changes and saw
the trend of MS-Windows
becoming the next
technology generation
(Mainly became a hot
discussion in 1995) 
The acquaintance of a
few fresh programmers
with the MS-Windows
The strategic decision to
abandon many old pro-
ducts and only focus on
office automation
systems
(Mainly started in 1993) 
The limitations of MS-




demand from their large
client base
(Mainly started in 1993)
The recognition of the
limitations of MS-DOS
relative to Windows, and
their strategy to focus on
state of the art tech-
nologies 
Actions and the roles of embedded
actors 
Scrutinizing old IS limitations (ceasing
indwelling SRM)
• Technical teams and middle managers
and later top management and sales
and marketing made sense of the
limitations of old systems relate to new
ones
• Technical development teams were
searching for the comparable
(For the entire year 1993
and before March 1994)
Examining the limitations





to help the valuation of
old product for selling
them out
(Frequently observed
during 1995 and 1996;
and later as an important
set of actions until 1999)





DOS to exactly see
which features were
problematic and which
(Intensively for the years
1993-1994; and later as
occasional actions
during 1995-1999 when




change request was diffi-
cult due to basic limita-
tions of MS-DOS)
Scrutinizing MS-DOS
(From 1993-1994 as the
intensive period of
realization, yet still often
surging in the
discussions until 2002)
Extensively done by R&D
team and the production
team and required formal
R&D projects due to the
huge investment in
developing various
technical tools related to
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advantages and capabilities of the old
technologies and related products
relative to the new ones
• Senior experts highly specialized in the
old systems were posing novel
questions about old systems
ones were still viable and




done with regard to the
implications of moving
toward more integrated











Discrediting the viability of (parts of)
old IS (ceasing legitimization SRM)
• Product managers in discussion with
technical teams were distinguishing
between viable and obsolete aspects of
old systems and discussing the
boundaries between them
• Forward jumpers were discrediting old
systems by highlighting the new
technological opportunities and
deficiencies of old systems
• Middle managers had to constantly
convince forward jumpers to not
disregard the entire old systems as
obsolete
• Marketing managers and agents were
carefully decoupling between internal
and external legitimacy of the old
systems
Most of the managers
(except the financial
manager) and technical
team (except two sea-
soned programmers)
already considered the
old systems as obsolete
Extensively engaging a
wide range of managers
and technical experts
with general tendency to
consider many aspects
as viable at the begin-
ning, especially the






the level of basic product





Initially (during the first
half of 1993) it was only
done for few aspects of
MS-DOS (e.g., parallel
processing); yet later it
required more effort by





• Paying attention to the detailed,
technical characteristics and examining
various potential technological features
that appeared to be limiting the
capacities and functions of the old IS
• Reopening the list of shortcomings of
the technology that were worked around
and adjusted locally in past upgrades
and maintenance 
(Through free
discussions at the end of
the weeks during 1993)
A list of MS-DOS short-
comings was created in
order to convince the
financial office and their
partners that MS-DOS
had no future 
Scrutinizing was limited
to only those aspects
that could not be easily
improved based on their
deep expertise in MS-
DOS technology







reflect on the limitations
of MS-DOS even though
many of the
shortcomings of the MS-
DOS was improved by
the technical team
Delegitimization º scrutinizing
• The discussion about the boundaries
between old-viable and old-obsolete
required inspecting some detailed
technological features and aspects in
more details (to see which aspect is
really the problematic aspect)
CEO asked in middle
1993 the head of
technical team to create




DOS and what were the
things that needed to be
kept in the new product
(an ongoing task during
year 1993)






stressed:  “let’s be
careful not to through
away the good apples”
To unpack the range of
interdependencies
between data, codes,
and designs that might
not work properly in
integrated design
It became relevant when
some new features of
MS-DOS were further
developed, e.g., the
possibility of working with
graphical peripheral





• The longer and deeper experience and
specialization in old IS º required more
time and efforts to reopen the taken-for-
granted details of old IS and carefully
distinguish viable and obsolete aspects
• The larger number of interconnected
technological elements and products
related to old IS (relevant in LargLenient
and LargStrict) º required more
extensive discussions and examinations
for distinguishing between old-viable
and old-obsolete aspects of old IS
• The dominance of forward jumpers with
Small number of clients
(10 clients) 
Their long experience
with MS-DOS and up-to-
date technical managers
and employees made
them have the feeling
“we are done with MS-
DOS”!
A simple, stand-alone




ments related to MS-
DOS systems, with a few
seasoned experts on
MS-DOS challenged the
realization, yet the small
number of products
facilitated the realization
that the products should
be sooner or later
abandoned
The large customer base
and still growing demand












which made it difficult to




the firm to work on state-
of-the art technology
facilitated realization
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the culture of appeal to new technology,
in comparison with seasoned
specialized experts on old IS º
supporting the de-legitimization of old
IS, though increasing the risk of
immaturely de-legitimizing the entire old
IS path too early 
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Table A2.  Marginalization
Marginalization SmallCo MedCo LargStrict LargLenient
Triggers
• The fear that the old systems might
never be discontinued although the new
systems were developed
• Realizing the high cost of keeping and
maintaining the old systems and
especially the gateways (cutting
gateways) 
• The usage of the new systems in a
stable way (initial bugs and problems
were solved and it was routinized)
(In early 1994), The deci-
sion and agreement to
sell the document
management product
and all the support
contracts to the financial
officer to start a new
business 
The development of the
new Windows-based
office automation as the
core product to focus on,
in late 2000 and early
2001
(Early 2002) when the
new MS-Windows pro-
ducts became stable and
passed various tests
(Started in 2002 for
some clients)
The usage of new
systems in a stable way






Actions and the roles of embedded
actors 
Ceasing learning about old IS (ceasing
learning SRM)
• Technical and HR managers gradually
stopped R&D projects, training, and the
hiring on the domains specific to old
systems
• IS Product managers in negotiation with
support teams were carefully
distinguishing between ‘major’ and
‘minor’ changes into the systems based
on their learning commitments
• Production and HR managers
selectively isolated old and new systems
teams and located them in distinct
organizational units
• R&D and HR managers proactively
prevented narrow specialization in
domains that might become obsolete
quickly
Naturally happened due
to the limited client base




reversed when an influ-
ential client urged the
company to fix a major
bug or add a major
feature in the old
products 
Mainly by short-term
isolation of the MS-DOS
team from the new MS-
Windows team during
2000 and 2001 when the
new product was
designed, and gradually
outflow of the MS-DOS
experts during 2002 and
2003
(Mainly started in mid
2002 and mostly done
through 2003)







2002, but continued as
an ongoing process until
2005 and even later until
2009)
For each set of clients






the gateways for them)
Often started by stopping
formal learning actions
such as official trainings





and debugging the old
systems 
Action:  De-routinizing old IS (ceasing
routinization SRM)
• Marketing and Support managers
specified clear deadlines for terminating
the support of old systems
• Support teams paralyzed the old
systems in order not to be used by
clients that already adopted new
systems
• HR managers helped some seasoned
experts to move to other companies
where they could find a relevant position
• Production managers and support
teams (when recommending to clients)
removed the technological objects (e.g.,
operating systems, programming tools,
and test tools) to prevent working on the
old systems
• Top managers (often CEOs) supported
the teams of seasoned experts who
were not willing to move to new domains
to create their spin-offs
• Production managers and the technical
team of old IS carefully codified the old
systems to allow them move on to new
systems teams and for future occasional
requests
Naturally and smoothly






experts moved to the
new company created by
the financial officer
(Gradually during 2002
and 2003; but still
ongoing for the following
five years) Mainly by
reducing the workload on
the MS-DOS by stopping
the support contracts




clients’ access to the old
systems and formally
banning the internal
team to work on the DOS
systems (and asking for
documenting the
important aspects of the




by MS-DOS experts and
redirecting support
requests to them
In a gradual process and
often with the collabor-
ation of each client for
making it less accessible
to use the old systems
and assigning less work
on the upgrading the old
systems to the technical
team
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Ceasing learning º de-routinization
• When systems were not developed
further, the clients have lower chance to
keep using them (terminating support
contracts)




systems by arguing that
SmallCo no longer had
the capabilities to do so
By selling out the old
products and
outsourcing the support






Often did not happen
immediately, given the
bargaining power of
clients to ask for
changes to the old
systems
De-routinization º ceasing learning
• The fewer users and clients used the
legacy system, the less the need for
support and updating activities (thus
less learning to do so)
(Mainly in 1994, and less
in 1995) CEO and the
head of technical team
were constantly asking
their programmers not to
fix the bugs related to
the old systems; yet this
was once every two or
three months interrupted
due to the major support
requests of clients
Having less major
improvements on the old
systems during 2002 and
2003 and discussing with
their clients to use their
new product instead of
having the old products
improved
Often happened for a
large part of clients by
rejecting their major
change requests 
Often effective for junior
programmers and
support team
For senior experts, often
happened in a gradual




• The relatively low bargaining power of
companies against their influential
clients (in all cases except LargStrict) º
forced the companies to come back
occasionally to the old systems to
relearn about the old systems in order to
apply major change requests
• Deep specialization º made it hard for
seasoned experts to stop relying on
their deeply rooted expertise
• The scope and interdependency of
legacy systems (mainly in LargLenient
and LargStrict) º posed serious
challenges on dissolving legacy
resources; and made it difficult to move
clients who have been using many inter-
connected products on the old systems
Limited number of clients
facilitated marginalizing
the legacy IS 





support requests to them
Low bargaining power





commitments in terms of








Having and forming a




The strategy of admitting
clients’ requests and
deep specialization in
MS-DOS and the large
amount of technical
interdependencies
between the old products
took a lot of time and
effort to marginalize the
old IS
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Table A3.  Reversion
Reversion SmallCo MedCo LargStrict LargLenient
Triggers
• Ongoing requests from the clients on
the old system
• Lack of readiness and instability of the
new system





sold to partners and
the new product was
completely different






(almost a couple of
times in the years
between 1993 and
1995)




triggered some efforts to
keep MD-DOS and
several of its related tools
(Started in 1995 but was
completed in 2000)
Long delay in developing
the new integrated prod-
ucts and making them
stable and some problems
in the new products kept
many clients asking for
reverting back to MS-DOS
(Mainly started in 1994)
Long delay (more than ten
years) to develop new
alternative systems and




Actions and the roles of embedded
actors
• Re-legitimizing old IS (intensifying
legitimization SRM)
• Product managers were promoting old
IS as still viable solutions in short-term
• Product managers and marketing
agents were constantly highlighting the
relative advantages of old systems
against the immature versions of new
technologies
(As an ongoing attempt
during 1996-1999)
Often focused on internal
attempts by senior MS-
DOS experts who were




had to carefully ensure
that even internal discus-
sion regarding the prob-
lems of MS-DOS did not
affect their credibility for
clients who were still
actively using the legacy
products
(For the entire period of
1995-2000 intensively and




A major effort to convince
technical teams to keep
the development and
upgrade of the old
systems especially when
some other teams were
working on the new
systems (a feeling of
being left behind)
(Started mainly in early
1995 but continued
actively until 2002 as a
formal department and






and by marketing team
externally 
Learning more about the old IS to
maintain it (intensifying learning SRM)
• Seasoned, specialized experts were
actively identifying the shortcomings of
old systems and improve them in an
effective way
• Senior experts in old IS rediscovered
several untapped potentials of old sys-
tems and developed them
• Product managers and development
teams launched new development
projects to improve the functionalities of
old systems
Mainly through update and
support activities to
improve the old systems
and therefore keep clients
satisfied; Technical
Manager had to motivate
the young programmers to
still see working on MS-
DOS as an important job
Often through a selected
list of change requests
after being approved by
the production manager to
exclude major design
changes and limit to really
urgent requests
Often in the form of R&D
projects on the MS-DOS
and linking them with the
major improvements in the
old products 
Re-legitimizing º learning to improve
• Knowing which aspects of the old IS
were considered as viable and thus
could and should be further improved
meanwhile
(Mainly from 1996-1999,
for every major request
from clients and every
month for the small
change requests) Through
the approval of most of
change and support
requests by the technical
manager and the head of
support team
Reapproving some of the
change requests on the
DOS systems that were
initially rejected (and later
accepted because the
alternative systems were
not yet ready and stable)
Approving many clients’
major requests to update
DOS-based products
Learning to improve º re-legitimizing
• The improvement of old IS turn it into a
viable solution to be presented to the
clients
(Mainly from 1996-1999,
often when a major limita-
tion was discovered that
could not be easily
addressed in the current
systems)
To highlight the relevant









promoting the internal MS-
DOS technical team by
the managers 
Contextual conditions shaping Given the small Being open to clients’ Large number of clients Extensive client base and
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realization
• Legacy commitments to old IS (for
LargLenient and MedCo) and the
dominance of public, large clients (for
MedCo and SmallCo) and increasing
demand for support contracts º forced
the companies to keep learning on the
old systems and improve them by
dedicating teams to learn on and
develop the old systems
• The larger number of interconnected
technological elements and products
related to old IS (relevant in LargLenient
and LargStrict) º heightened the rever-
sion since improving one part requires
subsequent improvement in other parts
• Deeper specialization in old IS (mainly
in LargLenient and LargStrict) º
enabled the companies to dedicate
further resources and capabilities to
improve old systems
client base, the fact
























using the multiple legacy
systems and the fact that
the new systems were not
stable required con-
siderable reversion efforts;
yet it was challenging due




combined with the strategy
of the company to address
the support requests of
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Table A4.  Handover
Handover SmallCo MedCo LargLenient LargStrict
Triggers
• The development of the new systems and making
sure they are stable 
• The shrinking market on the old systems (especially
for the cases that they had major delay in
developing new systems in comparison to the other
competitors)
Given that the old
product was
completely sold out















the old product, the







did not use many
of the aspects of








in many cases, the
clients (often with
the help of MedCo)
started entering
new data to their
systems
(Started during 2000 and
gradually expanded until
the end of 2002)
The development of
Windows-based systems
in which the basic design
of the products were also
significantly improved
comparing with the MS-
DOS
(Mainly at the end of
2001 for the core prod-
ucts and until the end of
2002 for other peripheral
products) When new
systems became stable
Actions and the roles of embedded actors 
• Learning more about old IS to connect old and new
IS (intensifying learning SRM)
• Production managers and a selected team of highly
skilled developers who mastered both old and new
IS domains launched new development projects to
connect old and new systems by developing and
deploying gateways
• Support teams were setting deadlines on using
gateways for clients
• Technical developers at the support team limited
the functionalities of gateways (e.g., making them
one-way ; that is, from the old to the new system)
(From 2000-2002 as a
formal line of production,
later as extension pro-
jects until 2005 and
afterward as occasional
tasks when a major
change to old products
was done)
Extensively engaged in
creating ways of con-












Mainly for converting the
legacy data from sys-
tems to new integrated
database structures
(often for large clients);
highly challenging
because of the many
interdependent products,
data elements, and busi-
ness processes that had
to be integrated in the
new systems and still
support legacy data and
functions
Reallocating viable resources from old to new IS
path (ceasing resource complementarity SRM)
• HR managers integrated old IS teams into new IS
teams to leverage their common, basic knowledge
• HR managers in collaboration with technical
managers defined transitional tasks for seasoned
experts of old IS to gradually move to new IS teams
Often the designers and
support team were real-
located, but less pro-
grammers; transferring
legacy data and the
functionalities of the old
systems became a major
technical challenge; ten-




team and support teams
to be able develop and
support the new systems






Learning to connect old and new º reallocating
from old to the new
• Convertors allow for transferring legacy data from
old to new IS
• Gateways allow that many customers start working
with the new systems through and with the help of
the old IS (e.g., using old IS legacy data but through
the applications of the new IS)
• Connecting old and new IS makes the two systems
both support the historical routines, roles, functions
(backward compatibility) which then allows
organizations and their clients be able to keep the
same legacy of business processes and routines
and use them in the new systems (thus for them not
everything should be changed)
Often was extensively
done for transferring











gateways (in 2001 it
became comparable with
the projects dedicated to
design new systems)
Reallocating from old to the new º learning to
connect old and new
• Once the same users and same business
processes, and same functions and roles were
transferred to the new IS, it requires that old and
new IS be more connected to bring all the related
legacy data and features (more need to develop
gateways and convertors)
Through creating dedi-
cated R&D projects and
teams to focus on
learning more about MS-




bility of old and new
system
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Contextual conditions shaping realization
• The technological differences between old and new
systems posed challenges for connecting them via
gateways, and created a knowledge gap between
old and new IS teams, which challenged their
migration to new team
• The business process continuity in clients’ side and
the instability of the new systems (in all cases)
increased the period during which gateways had to
be deployed
• The scope and interdependency of legacy systems
(mainly in LargLenient and LargStrict) required the
development of complex gateways in order to deal


























nents, and the need to
guarantee business
process continuity, the
handover involved a lot
of effort and expertise
The big difference
between the design and
production of products in
MS-DOS and integrated
systems in Windows and
the many interdepen-
dencies in the legacy
products in terms of the
various data elements
and business processes
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Table A5.  Iterations Between the Phases
Interactions Between the Phases SmallCo MedCo LargStrict LargLenient
Between Realization and Reversion
Discrediting old IS »º re-legitimizing
old IS
• Knowing which aspects are old-obsolete
helps relegitimizing the other aspects
that are old-viable
• Tension between discrediting some
aspects, but not delegitimizing the entire
legacy IS
Learning to maintain the old º
discrediting old IS
• Discovering new shortcomings and
realizing how fundamental are some of
the limitations of the old IS and how
costly to fix them






still keep it as a viable
solution for their
clients
(For two years since 1993 as a
continues discussion among
different groups of designers,
programmers, and gradually in
late 1994 among the middle
and top management) 
Major tensions regarding the
prestige of working on new
systems and the feeling of
being discriminated if asked to
work on the old systems; by
realizing the cost and efforts
needed for making such
change and improvement in
the old IS
(For around four years from
1994 to 2000, iteratively)
A lot of discussions due to the
complexity of the products and
their interdependencies
Often happened at the very
late phases that the cost of
marinating MS-DOS systems
appeared to become too much
Between Reversion and Handover
Learning to maintain the old º learning
to connect old and new
• Deeper knowledge that requires
creating gateways (more at the funda-
mental levels of data structure compati-
bility and the consistency with the
different operating systems, and the
capability to support some specific
business processes)
Learning to connect old and new º
learning to maintain the old
• Keeping legacy IS next to the new
working and thus the need for mainten-
ance continues 
• Deeper learning for creating gateways
enhances the capability to find ways to
improve the legacy and thus maintain it 
Not observed Not relevant since the
new MS-Windows
system was complete
different from the old




2001 and 2002 in parallel with
designing the new products)
To ensure that the changes to
the legacy products are
considered in (re)designing
and implementing gateways
and the new systems
The complexity of the many
interdependent products often
required a lot of efforts to
systematically examine the
parts that can be affected by a
change in the legacy IS and
therefore be considered in
designing gateways and new
products
(Frequently during 2000-2002
in parallel with redesigning
new products) 
Through formal, dedicated
R&D projects on gateways and
appointing the senior MS-DOS
experts to them
The senior MS-DOS experts
acting as brokers between the
gateways teams and MS-DOS
support teams
Between Handover and Marginalization
Reallocating from old to new º ceasing
learning on the old
• Especially when the legacy data and
functionalities is transferred, then the
support activities can be stopped 
• Reallocating the technical teams to new
IS development and support naturally
reduces their learning on the legacy
domains
Not observed Not relevant since the
new MS-Windows
system was complete
different from the old
system and the new
technical team was
newly hired
(During 2012 and 2013)
More as one-directional force
for the production and support
team by formally banning their
engagement with the old
products
(Iteratively done from 2002
until 2005 for most of the
clients and later for clients who
were late in replacing MS-
DOS)
Often by reallocating the
production and R&D experts to
work on the MS-Windows and
for the clients when their
legacy data and systems’
configurations were transferred
to the new systems; to
customize gateways for clients
Between Marginalization and Reversion
De-routinizing »º learning more about
old IS to maintain
• Failing to de-routinize required learn
further about the old systems since the
customers kept asking changes as long
as they used it
• Even when legacy IS was de-routinized,
some occasional requests will take back
and requires relearning to maintain the
legacy 
Not observed Several support
requests that most of
them were handled by
MedCo but gradually
some of them were
outsourced to other
companies after 2001
Limitedly observed after 2002;
Only occasionally happened
for very urgent problems
requested by large companies
(Iteratively, for each set of
major change requests from
2002 until 2005 and later as
occasional projects and tasks
until 2009)
Frequently happening due to
the extensive use of MS-DOS
systems by large number of
influential clients 
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Appendix B
Validity and Transparency Considerations
Table B1.  Strategies for Enhancing the Validity and Transparency
Validity Measure Strategies for Addressing
Construct validity • Relying on a theoretically informed conceptual framework based on unlearning literature to opera-
tionalize various IS elements, discontinuance practices, and involved roles.
• Sticking to interview protocols consisting of three sections:  (1) getting to know the background of
the company; (2) describing the whole replacement process; and (3) eliciting the discontinuance
story by focusing on the various IS elements, practices and roles.
• Adopting an open inquiry approach to reduce the bias due to imposing some terms on the
informants (e.g., using “old stuff” instead of just saying “obsolete knowledge” (that could be
interpreted differently by various actors).  This also helped us capture a variety of elements in the
discontinuance process.
• Triangulation of data sources by asking questions at least from two relevant informants, and in case
of inconsistencies, continuing the process to resolve it; covering external informants (e.g., ex-
employees) to complement internal informants’ opinions.
• The main findings were presented to three companies (SMLFC, MedCo, and LargLenient) to identify
and fix potential misunderstandings.
• In the data analysis process, a second researcher re-coded 20% randomly selected of interviews
(coding for IS elements and discontinuance practices).  We discussed the new insights emerged in
the second round of coding.
Internal validity • (Through research design and analysis) by selecting extreme cases and through cross-case
comparison we could capture the potential conditions that shaped the discontinuance process.
• (During data collection) paying specific attention to “who did what,” “when,” and “why did actors did
so” to identify the rationales and causes behind discontinuance practices.
External validity
(generalization)
• There is no claim about generalization, since the aim of the paper is understanding deeply the
discontinuance process.  However, the comparison between companies helped us articulate
mechanisms that explain how the process can be differently shaped by legacy IS conditions; thus
showing the boundary conditions of the propositions.
Transparency and 
responsibility
• Relying on case study protocol and interview protocol.
• Using a case study report for each company as a compendium of all information that helped us
codify and articulate information from various sources.
• Using ATLAS.ti for managing codes and memos, helping systematic iterations between data
analysis stages, especially when some ambiguities required re-examination of the codes instances.
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